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Trends in Communist Media

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**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST  
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## **Trends in Communist Media**

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17 SEPTEMBER 1975  
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## SALT

## RED STAR ARTICLE ATTACKS U.S. CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

A Soviet military commentator writing in RED STAR has sharply criticized U.S. plans to develop long-range submarine-launched cruise missiles, asserting that their deployment would enable the United States to circumvent the restraints of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet interim agreement limiting strategic offensive arms. At the same time, recent Soviet comment on the SALT negotiations has continued to convey a sense of progress and restrained optimism that a new SALT agreement will result from Brezhnev's forthcoming U.S. visit.

**CRITICISM OF U.S. CRUISE MISSILES** Reserve Captain N. Shaskolskiy, writing in the 10 September RED STAR, charged directly only that the Pentagon's "plans" for the cruise missile indicated its desire to fuel the arms race and frustrate detente--charges that are routine in Soviet discussions of U.S. military programs. But through his selection of "foreign press material" to describe the U.S. cruise missile program, Shaskolskiy in effect argued that full realization of the program would allow the United States to sidestep the 1972 interim agreement--which covered only ballistic missiles--by allowing the deployment of strategic (cruise) missiles on up to 50 submarines in addition to the 44 submarines with ballistic missiles allowed by the agreement. (A cruise missile is, in effect, an unmanned aircraft which unlike a ballistic missile remains within the atmosphere throughout its flight.)

Shaskolskiy clearly implied that the rekindled U.S. interest in cruise missiles was a direct result of the limitations on ballistic missiles set by the earlier SALT agreement. He stopped short of directly asserting that the cruise missile program was incompatible with the 1972 agreements, as USA Institute observer Georgiy Svyatov had charged in relation to the Trident submarine program in RED STAR articles in 1972 and 1973.

Shaskolskiy's article represents the first known Soviet comment on U.S. cruise missile development since such missiles became a SALT issue in the wake of the November 1974 Vladivostok understanding between President Ford and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev. However, ZA RUBEZHOM, a Moscow-based weekly survey of the foreign press, last March reprinted a Herbert Scoville article in the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR that made similar charges. The Scoville reprint had concluded that "the development of cruise missiles for submarines should be stopped immediately. The United States cannot allow itself to create all the technically feasible types of weapons not banned under the SALT agreements."

Quoting Western sources, Shaskolskiy noted that the submarine-launched cruise missile was designed to be compatible with conventional torpedo

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tubes and to fly at low altitudes where defense radar is less effective. He noted further that the new missile is scheduled to enter service in 1979, test results so far having been termed "excellent." His article was published as part of a regular series that discusses Western weapons developments, nominally on the basis of foreign press sources. Contributions to this series normally eschew politically sensitive issues. But the Shaskolskiy article seems to carry implications for the current round of SALT in Geneva where the status of cruise missiles in a final agreement must be decided.

Shaskolskiy's arguments suggest his support for a total ban on cruise missiles. That position was implied, for example, in his stress on the difficulties of verifying limits on such missiles if they were incorporated in a new agreement, due to their similarity to tactical missiles, their compatibility with conventional torpedo tubes, and a restricted capability to monitor cruise missile testing programs due to their low altitude. Moscow normally shuns public discussion of technical issues such as verification and, in particular, discussion of the possibility that limits under consideration might be difficult to verify by national technical means.

ASSESSMENT OF  
SALT PROGRESS

While as usual there has been very little direct comment on the SALT negotiations from Moscow, Soviet media have made use of the Ford-Brezhnev meetings at Helsinki and the August visit to Moscow by a U.S. Congressional delegation to suggest that only technical difficulties remain and to reject the notion of "some Western observers" that an impasse has been reached.

In a Moscow radio roundtable discussion on 22 August, TASS General Director Leonid Zamyatin quoted Brezhnev as having told the U.S. congressmen that "probably two or three meetings, including one at the foreign ministers level," would be required to resolve these technical problems. Despite such official optimism, some concern about Washington's thinking on strategic issues seemed evident in remarks by CPSU Politburo candidate member Boris Ponomarev at an early July Kremlin conference on the 40th anniversary of the 7th Comintern Congress. The text of Ponomarev's speech, just published in KOMMUNIST No. 11, 1975, reveals his complaint that some officials in the West "have again started saying that the United States should possess superior military potential."

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## NUCLEAR TEST BAN

## MOSCOW PROPOSES NEW COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROHIBITION AT UN

The new Soviet draft proposal for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests, offered as the USSR's yearly arms control initiative for the UN General Assembly session that opened 16 September, reiterates Moscow's known position on a total test ban and incorporates two relatively recent shifts in the Soviet position. The text of the draft treaty submitted to the United Nations was published in PRAVDA on 12 September.

The two adjustments in the Soviet position evident in the published draft treaty are these:

+ The treaty would enter into force only after ratification by all nuclear powers, a position that Moscow first assumed in early 1974.

+ Provisions for exchange of seismic data as a supplement to national technical means of verification of the ban are incorporated into the text of the document as binding obligations. In past years, Moscow had said it would agree to such an exchange on a voluntary basis subsequent to agreement on a total test ban. The evolution in recent years from voluntary exchanges to binding obligations was confirmed last July in the U.S.-Soviet threshold test ban signed in Moscow, which stipulated the exchange of such data.

There is no provision for on-site inspection in the current draft. Moscow has long argued that such inspection was unnecessary in light of advances in the capability of national technical means, and it has contended that U.S. insistence on on-site inspection disguised a lack of serious U.S. interest in a total test ban. The draft Soviet treaty specifically exempts peaceful explosions from its provisions banning nuclear tests. Such explosions would be allowed subject, for non-nuclear weapon states, to guidelines established in the 1968 Treaty on Non-proliferation, and for states possessing nuclear weapons, to procedures yet to be agreed. In the latter case, "due consideration" would be given to recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The USSR has regularly voiced its support for a total ban on nuclear weapons tests since the 1950's. Reacting to criticism of the limited nature of the 1974 U.S.-Soviet threshold ban, Brezhnev and other officials had publicly reiterated that the Soviet Union was

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willing at any time to agree to a full ban. In recent years the Chinese have increasingly replaced the United States as the main target of Soviet criticism for the failure of efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

Early Soviet comment on the new initiative has shed little further light on it. Underscoring its public relations aspect, one commentator on the 14 September Moscow domestic radio roundtable on foreign affairs said the new initiative "testifies to the fact that the Soviet Union is implementing the all-European conference's decisions not in words but in deeds."

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW SNIPES AT SINAI ACCORD, U.S. POLICY, EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE

Soviet media have continued to give only scant but critical attention to the recent Sinai disengagement agreement. Scattered routine-level comment has again conveyed Moscow's displeasure with aspects of the accord and the U.S. diplomatic role in negotiating it. Through selective citation of foreign reaction, Moscow has implicitly criticized Cairo for cooperating with Washington and for entering into the new pact with Israel. Such criticism as has appeared in the Soviet press has come not in the major central papers but, initially, in the weekly NEW TIMES and subsequently in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA and RURAL LIFE. A wide-ranging critique of the accord in the 7 September MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in effect recapitulated earlier comment, highlighting as a "complicating element" the provision for a U.S. presence at the Sinai early-warning stations.\* A RURAL LIFE article on the 13th warned that U.S. attempts to obtain unilateral advantages "directly or indirectly" in the Middle East would be incompatible with detente.

Moscow has reacted cautiously to Western press reports concerning the existence of secret understandings among the United States, Israel and Egypt supplementing the public agreements. Careful to use non-Soviet sources, Moscow has publicized reported secret Egyptian commitments, citing agreements to ease its stand in the Arab economic boycott against firms dealing with Israel and to reduce its anti-Israeli propaganda by stopping broadcasts to Israel and shutting down Palestinian broadcasts from Cairo. Despite Moscow's circumspection in criticizing Cairo and its avoidance of direct attacks on President as-Sadat, there have been ample signs in Cairo media that Soviet-Egyptian relations have become increasingly strained, particularly following Moscow's refusal to attend the 4 September signing of the Sinai accord in Geneva. And as-Sadat has been markedly explicit recently in citing Egyptian grievances concerning Soviet policy.

**U.S. ROLE** For the second time since the initialing of the Sinai accord, TASS Deputy Director General Sergey Losev has in effect questioned the U.S. commitment to detente in the light of U.S. actions in the Middle East. His first such comment came in a 2 September broadcast to North American audiences, and he again broached this idea in a 13 September RURAL LIFE article devoted largely

\* For Moscow's initial reaction to the Sinai disengagement agreement, initialed by Egypt and Israel on 1 September and signed in Geneva on 4 September, see the TRENDS of 4 September, pages 1-5.

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to proclaiming the benefits of improved U.S.-Soviet relations and warning against persons and actions opposed to detente. The fact that Losev's comments appeared in a specialized central press newspaper not noted for important foreign affairs articles seems to indicate Soviet hesitancy to express such views in a more authoritative vehicle.

The concluding section of Losev's article began by criticizing in standard terms an alleged U.S. military buildup of its allies, asserting that such a policy was fraught with "highly dangerous consequences," especially in the Middle East, "which is currently being 'injected' with massive doses of the latest American arms." Losev then went on to warn that

Attempts to gain unilateral advantages directly or indirectly, including such attempts in the Near East area, would be incompatible with the strengthening of relations between the United States and the USSR; and it is not superfluous to recall this principle in this specific situation.

An article by IZVESTIYA political commentator Mikhaylov in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on the 7th represented one of Moscow's most extensive critiques of the accord thus far, but the article largely recapitulated previous comment, and its appearance in the Moscow city party and soviet organ, rather than the central press, again suggests restraint. Mikhaylov's most notable objection to the accord was his presentation of the talks as "obviously of a separate nature," despite the fact that the signing of the agreement took place in Geneva "to make it look as if the talks had taken place within the framework" of the Geneva conference. Mikhaylov also complained that the agreement simply "freezes" the Mideast situation, and he objected to the idea of a U.S. presence in Sinai "replacing" the monitoring by UN military observers under UN Security Council decision.

Moscow has continued to promote an impression of U.S. domestic unease over the new Sinai accord. TASS reviewed a PRAVDA international review article by S. Vishnevskiy on the 14th, for example, which claimed that U.S. public and congressional opinion has become concerned over recent Mideast events, including Israel's prospective military buildup following the recent U.S. decision to lift its suspension of new weapons supplies and "plans for placing American experts in the Sinai, etc." According to TASS, the article contrasted these developments with the approach it said was favored by "many sober-minded Americans," one of "realism and circumspection" toward "difficult international problems" which takes into account "the mutual interests of all the sides concerned."

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A short TASS account of President Ford's 16 September press conference noted that it was devoted "chiefly" to U.S.-Israeli relations and the Mideast situation. The dispatch reported the President as saying, with regard to press reports of U.S. promises of F-16 fighter bombers and Pershing missiles to Israel, that the United States "did not give any firm promise" in this regard, but that these types of arms were included in the shopping list and would be discussed with Israeli representatives. As to whether the United States was moving toward concluding a security treaty with Israel, TASS reported President Ford as saying he would not use this term, and would simply reiterate that the United States had always supplied Israel with considerable quantities of military equipment and intended to do so in the future.

CRITICISM OF CAIRO To convey thinly veiled criticism of Cairo for signing the Sinai accord, Moscow has sought to press the point that Egypt has entered into "secret understandings" with Israel and the United States, attributing such reports to non-Soviet sources.

+ Moscow's treatment of Egypt's 11 September suspension of broadcast privileges for the Voice of Palestine in Cairo is illustrative. By citing Palestinian and Western sources, and ignoring Egyptian justifications, Moscow implied its support for the Palestinian-Syrian argument that Egypt had betrayed the Palestinians in agreeing secretly to end propaganda against Israel. Soviet reportage on this issue has blurred the distinction between, on the one hand, Cairo's suspension of Voice of Palestine broadcasts because of what Cairo considered unacceptable Palestinian criticisms related to the Sinai accord and, on the other, Cairo's reported agreement to reduce its own propaganda broadcasts against Israel as a nonpublic supplement to that accord.

+ Moscow has also transparently, if indirectly, swiped at Cairo in comment emphasizing the value of the Arab economic boycott of foreign companies dealing with Israel. An Arabic-language commentary on 29 August by A. Zlatorunskiy criticized the anticipated Sinai accord for "certain political aspects," referring to New York TIMES and REUTER accounts of reported Egyptian agreement to ease the economic boycott of U.S. and possibly European firms. A commentary in Arabic on 8 September, pegged to a recent meeting of the Arab boycott organization, stressed that the boycott was "among the important steps" hindering Western-Israeli cooperation and had caused Israel difficulties in obtaining certain raw materials from regular Western suppliers. The broadcast approvingly presented, as the opinion of

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the boycott organization, the view that "it is necessary for the Arabs to continue to use the boycott weapon in the struggle against the aggressors."\*

+ A third theme of Soviet comment, U.S. military aid to Israel, also at times seems implicitly critical of Egypt for having been duped as to Israel's ultimate intentions. A Moscow domestic service commentary by V. Aleksandrov on the 10th charged that Israel, "under the guise of peace talks," was concurrently seeking additional U.S. aid to enable it to "dictate conditions to the Arabs" and "blatantly challenge UN decisions." TASS on the 8th took note of Drew Middleton's 6 September New York TIMES article on Israel's arms procurement list, emphasizing the large quantities and sophisticated nature of the planned purchases. Tying the military aid to the Sinai accord, TASS asserted without amplification that the changes the accord would bring in the Arab-Israeli military situation encouraged Israel to build up its military forces.

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN  
RELATIONS

Moscow has continued to take no direct notice of President as-Sadat's continuing public complaints against the Soviet Union, but has responded in low key to paraphrases of his remarks in the Cairo press. A Moscow radio commentary in Arabic by A. Timoshkin on the 15th, for example, feigned surprise that "articles in some Cairo papers" would "mislead their readers regarding Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East." As one example, Timoshkin ostensibly took issue with AL-AKHBAR for alleging that the USSR benefited from Arab disunity--a charge made on 4 September by as-Sadat in a speech to a joint session of the People's Assembly and ASU Central Committee.\*\*

Soviet annoyance over charges that the USSR has tried to obstruct a Mideast peace settlement was registered recently at the low level of Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress, which in an Arabic

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\* Egypt has exhibited sensitivity to charges that Cairo is no longer seriously committed to the Arab boycott. Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi, in a statement published on the 12th by Cairo's AL-AHRAM, emphasized that Egypt remained committed to the principle of the boycott and denied that any Egyptian document pledged Egypt to lift the boycott from any organization or company.

\*\* Moscow in the past has transparently responded to as-Sadat's criticisms through the device of answering press replays of his statements; see, for example, the TRENDS of 23 July 1975, pages 3-6.

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broadcast on the 13th defended Soviet Mideast policy and denounced "imperialist propaganda" that the USSR wished "to increase tension in the area in order to strengthen its influence." The broadcast took indirect note of Egyptian media, adding that "naturally Arab reaction does not fail to join in this campaign," which the broadcast said intensified after the recent Sinai accord.

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## CHINA FOREIGN RELATIONS

## PRC SCORES CANCELING OF U.S. MAYORS' TRIP, NOTES OTHER VISITS

Peking has responded belatedly and at a low level to the U.S. announcement on 8 September canceling the scheduled visit to China by a U.S. mayors delegation because the Chinese had refused to admit one delegation member, the mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico. China's response was conveyed by a 16 September NCNA report giving the text of "observations" by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, the host organization for the mayors' visit. These "observations" discreetly avoided mentioning U.S. officials and reaffirmed China's continued desire to promote Sino-U.S. exchanges under terms of the February 1972 Shanghai communique. Peking's intent to continue such exchanges also was reflected in recent Chinese coverage of the first PRC trade delegation to travel to the United States and of the closing of the Chinese archeological exhibit's 8-month U.S. tour.

Peking's reaction to the mayors' visit cancellation--coming over a week after the National Committee for U.S.-China relations, the sponsoring group on the U.S. side, had issued its press release--recalls Peking's low-key response on 2 April this year, after the State Department had announced cancellation six days earlier of a Chinese entertainment troupe's scheduled U.S. tour because the Chinese insisted on including a song regarding the "liberation" of Taiwan in the troupe's repertoire.\* At that time Peking's reaction came in an NCNA report of an "interview" with the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the spokesman of the foreign ministry's information department. The language in the current response duplicates that of the 2 April complaint, accusing the U.S. side of "unreasonably" demanding Chinese concessions, of putting forth "groundless" charges, and of going against the "spirit" of the Shanghai communique, and it similarly concludes with stress on Peking's desire to continue Sino-U.S. exchanges.

The "observations" on the mayoral visit cancellation claimed that because of the "special situation in Puerto Rico," it would be "inappropriate" and "inconvenient" to welcome the San Juan mayor, adding that Peking had sought to substitute him with someone else.\*\*

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\* Peking's reaction at that time is discussed in the TRENDS of 2 April 1975, pages 17-18.

\*\* Though maintaining a low posture on the issue, Peking publicly characterizes Puerto Rico as under U.S. "colonial rule" and favorably notes the Puerto Rican people's "struggle" for independence--a position most recently set forth in a 28 July 1975 NCNA review of the economic situation on the island.

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It claimed that the U.S. side "unreasonably clung to its own idea," announced the cancellation "one-sidedly," and made groundless charges about which the Chinese "cannot but express our regret." It went on to rebut as a "pretext for self-justification" the U.S. position that Chinese refusal of the San Juan mayor had introduced a political element into such non-government exchanges out of keeping with the spirit of the Shanghai communique. The Chinese pointedly kept open the invitation to the mayors, however, expressing conviction that if the U.S. side acted appropriately, the visit "will ultimately take place and other exchanges between China and the United States will proceed smoothly."

OTHER CONTACTS, Peking has continued to give favorable coverage  
VISITS IN U.S. to the current visit by a PRC trade delegation  
to the United States, with NCNA on the 10th  
reporting the group's visit with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger  
on 8 September. NCNA noted that President Ford "welcomed" the  
delegation and asked them to convey his regards to Chairman Mao and  
Chou En-lai. This coverage was less effusive than NCNA treatment of  
meetings by former President Nixon with visiting Chinese gymnasts in  
July 1974 and with PRC journalists in May 1973, when NCNA had quoted  
selected excerpts from the former President's formal statements on  
those occasions. But President Ford did not make a formal statement  
upon receiving the Chinese delegates, as Nixon had done.

Peking at the same time has sustained its extraordinary coverage of  
the recently completed U.S. tour by the PRC archeological exhibit.  
NCNA on 29 August reported a 27 August reception in San Francisco at  
which PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Hua recalled the Nixon trip to  
China and the Shanghai communique and lauded the "step-by-step" develop-  
ment of Sino-U.S. exchanges. The report also cited U.S. Assistant  
Secretary of State Richardson's reference to Secretary Kissinger's  
view that "normalization of relations" with the PRC was a "permanent  
and essential element" in U.S. foreign policy. NCNA on 1 September  
similarly played up the exhibit's success as symptomatic of the  
"irresistible historical trend" in Sino-American friendship, and the  
agency on the 12th disclosed that on 10 September PRC museum officials  
had received U.S. officials accompanying the relics exhibit back to  
China.

#### PEKING COMMENT ON UN SESSION MILTER ON U.S., HARSHER ON USSR

Peking media treatment of the major U.S. and Soviet statements at the  
7th UN General Assembly special session in New York has showered less  
invective on the United States and more on the Soviet Union than did  
comparable Chinese coverage of the April 1974 6th UNGA special session.  
The Peking media's increasingly differentiated treatment of the two

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superpowers conforms with the keynote Chinese address at this year's session, which was softer on the United States and more explicit in depicting the USSR as the main international economic exploiter than was the major Chinese address at the April 1974 meeting.\*

Peking's only comment thus far on Secretary Kissinger's message to this year's special session was contained in two paragraphs of a 2 September NCNA review of speeches the previous day. The review noted critically that Kissinger had stressed the "worn-out tune of 'interdependence'" and was "attacking" oil-producing countries. Last April NCNA devoted four paragraphs to criticizing the Secretary's speech, stating that he not only "attacked" the oil producers but "threatened" the Third World and "groundlessly attributed" inflation to the increased price of international oil. NCNA this year also markedly reduced from last year its coverage of UN delegates' and other foreign statements rebutting Kissinger's message.

In contrast, Peking's criticism of the USSR was both more extensive and more authoritative than its treatment of Gromyko's speech at last year's session. Accompanying the usual NCNA comment, a signed 13 September PEOPLE'S DAILY article harshly refuted the Soviet address this year by UN Ambassador Malik. The article gave a lengthy diatribe against Soviet economic policies, referring to the Soviets as "bloodsuckers, speculators, unfeeling creditors and merchants of death," and adding emphatically that "the old-line imperialists would be inferior in comparison with the Kremlin, as the latter has not only applied their traditional methods of exploiting the developing countries but perfected them." Debunking Malik's claim of a "coincidence of views" between the USSR and the developing Third World states on economic issues, PEOPLE'S DAILY complained that the USSR, in its "plunder and fraud," has used such propaganda "as a pernicious supplement to rifle shots and leather whips."

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\* The 2 September 1975 UN address by PRC Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang is discussed in the TRENDS of 4 September 1975, pages 24-25. PRC coverage of the April 1974 UNGA special session is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 1-4.

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## P O R T U G A L

## MOSCOW DISPLAYS UNCERTAINTY IN TREATING POLITICAL SITUATION

Moscow has seemed indecisive as to what tack to take vis-a-vis the various forces involved in efforts to form a new government in Portugal, and has shown a tendency to fall back on Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) statements. Thus Soviet media have reported PCP assertions of the need for "compromise" among forces attempting to form the sixth provisional government to be headed by premier-designate Pinheiro de Azevedo. Moscow has also given warmer treatment to the PCP's erstwhile chief enemy--the Socialist Party (PS)--since PS leader Mario Soares' statement to the effect that the possibility of a coup from the right was an immediate threat. The PS' principal ally, the center-left Popular Democratic Party (PPD), has, however, been criticized by Moscow and the PCP for "anticommunist" statements and an uncooperative attitude. While the PPD has been labeled a "rightwing social democratic party" which is "outside the revolutionary process," PCP leader Alvaro Cunhal nevertheless has been quoted by Moscow as saying that PCP members may participate in a government with members of the PPD. Moscow reported without comment Azevedo's remark that communists, socialists, and popular democrats had "reached agreement" on a "common political program for the future government."

Moscow has also continued to criticize Western interference in Portuguese affairs, currently giving emphasis to ITT and other "foreign monopolies" whose CIA connections and "economic blackmail" have been called reminiscent of the pressure exerted against Chile before the 1973 coup.

**DOMESTIC SITUATION** Moscow has continued to stress Alvaro Cunhal's call for a dialog of progressive forces, with Albert Grigoryants noting, on Moscow radio's 14 September observers' roundtable program, that "broad discussions among all forces interested in the revolutionary process" would be helpful. And Soviet media have emphasized the PCP's willingness to compromise so that a new government can be formed. Thus, in an 11 September PRAVDA article, correspondents Yermakov and Kotov reported Cunhal's statement that "the way out of the impasse can be found only on the basis of a compromise" because "no single political formation, including the MFA," could solve the problem alone. In keeping with this seemingly conciliatory approach, Moscow has toned down its blasts at the Portuguese Socialists, especially since Soares' remark--in a L'EUROPEO interview replayed by Lisbon domestic service on the 13th--to the effect that a coup led by fascists, rather than communists, now seemed the "most likely threat" to Portugal.

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However, Moscow has stepped up its criticism of the socialist-allied PPD, roundtable observer Grigoryants noting that the formation of the new government "was delayed because of the position taken by the leaders of the Popular Democratic Party." Connecting the PPD with plans being made by "reactionary circles," Grigoryants asserted that "counterrevolution is abandoning all camouflage" in its efforts to reverse the revolutionary process. TASS on the 12th noted Cunhal's statement that, while "the Socialist Party began to recognize the presence of a real threat of fascism," the PPD failed to see the danger and, "on the contrary, went to a direct collusion with the fascists."

Although PRAVDA on the 11th reported the PCP as saying that the PPD was "outside the revolutionary process" and therefore unfit to participate in the government, other Moscow comment has shown an ambivalent attitude possibly because of an awareness that the PPD almost certainly will participate in the sixth government when formed. Thus TASS on the 12th reported Cunhal's refusal to enter into a "government based on the principle of a classic party coalition," but went on to quote him as saying that PCP members could participate, as individuals, in a government composed of members of other parties "or even members of the People's Democratic Party." Having given cautious approval to premier-designate Azevedo, Moscow reported Azevedo's 13 September television address in which he stated that an agreement had been reached between the communists, socialists and popular democrats on a common political program.

Soviet commentators, seemingly unsure of the line to take, have offered contradictory explanations for the removal of Azevedo's predecessor, Vasco Goncalves.\* KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA claimed on 9 September that "Goncalves' decision to refuse the post offered to him was by no means the result of pressure from the right" but was "an active step in the direction of further uniting the revolutionary wing." A 13 September IZVESTIYA article, however, admitted that Goncalves "made his exit under pressure from rightists" and that his departure was seen by the Portuguese press as "a temporary concession on the part of the leftwing forces."

FOREIGN MONOPOLIES      ITT's announcement of a suspension of financial support for its Portuguese subsidiaries sparked a series of comments on Western economic pressure, typified by Rudolf Puchkov's 13 September PRAVDA article accusing "foreign monopolies" of conducting a "deliberate policy of economic blackmail." Puchkov

\* Moscow's initial reaction to the downfall of Goncalves is discussed in the TRENDS of 10 September 1975, pages 4-5.

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observed that "foreign commentators" had pointed out that "monopoly capital employed similar tactics against the progressive regime in Chile," a connection underscored in a 12 September Moscow radio English-language commentary. The broadcast noted that "ITT subsidized Pinochet and his supporters who prepared the fascist coup in Chile," and that, not surprisingly, "ex-CIA agents have been flocking to ITT to meet growing demands for personnel."

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## VIETNAM

### PRG STATEMENT SETS OFF CAMPAIGN FOR SOUTHERN ECONOMIC REFORMS

Vietnamese communist leaders have launched what appears to be a major campaign to revamp South Vietnam's economy by eliminating big entrepreneurs who flourished under the former government and replacing them with structures suitable for the "advance toward socialism" announced by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong in his 1 September DRV National Day speech. The basic blueprint for the present mass campaign is a highly authoritative 10 September Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) statement, the first such government statement issued since the end of the war.\* The statement lays down a 14-point program indicating the regime's intention to deal harshly with the ills besetting the South's postwar economy, and in a manner apparently designed to bring it into conformity with its socialist model in the North.

The PRG statement, titled "on some policies on the restoration and development of industry and trade and the elimination of comprador bourgeois monopolists," and attendant publicity make it plain that a vigorous government crackdown is now underway to punish severely South Vietnamese businessmen who have been accused of "disrupting the market" and "undermining the revolution" through such alleged practices as speculation, smuggling, and hoarding, as well as allegedly maintaining contacts with "foreign spies and CIA agents."

In an apparent effort by the regime to enlist popular support for its policy of making scapegoats of the "comprador bourgeoisie" and to link their "crimes" with the South's economic problems, the media have been publicizing lists of those arrested and their crimes. These indicate that the illegal activities for which they have been charged mainly involved consumer goods, such as monosodium glutamate seasoning, rice, textiles, and bicycle parts--products whose price manipulation would directly affect the livelihood of the average person. As evidence of the beneficial results from the government's policy of punishing these "comprador bourgeoisie," a 14 September VNA report noted that prices of "many commodities" in Saigon's Chinese section of Cholon had dropped "20 to 50 percent" following issuance of the PRG statement.

Media reports of government attempts to curtail illegal business operations have made a number of references to Chinese being detained. According to a 21 September Liberation Radio account, "many of those arrested are of Chinese origin, and some are foreigners." The same broadcast openly

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\* The last PRG statement, issued on 26 April, is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 April 1975, pages 1-3.

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charged them with "exploiting Vietnamese . . . and Vietnamese compatriots of Chinese origin." An earlier Liberation Radio broadcast on the 10th, in reporting the arrests of "ringleaders" who had reportedly "speculated" in monosodium glutamate, claimed that one of them had "closely colluded with . . . Taiwan Kuomintang special service agents." An earlier instance of Vietnamese communist media focusing particular attention on the Chinese was a 12 July Liberation Press Agency (LPA) report on people returning to the countryside from the Saigon-Gia Dinh area. Noting that more than 125,000 people had gone to the rural areas since 10 May, the LPA report pointed out that some "5,000 Chinese residents in Saigon" had received farm tools for their use in Binh Phuoc Province.

Premier Pham Van Dong indicated in his 1 September DRV National Day remarks that South Vietnam now would be included--along with the North--in Vietnam's "advance toward socialism." Without further elaboration, Dong noted the existence of a "nationwide plan" that was to be the basis for "new developmental steps" in the South.\* While the 10 September PRG statement could not be construed as a nationwide plan, it could represent some of the "developmental steps" to which the Premier was alluding.

The 10 September issue of the Saigon newspaper GIAI PHONG (Liberation), in an editorial on the campaign, cited the National Day speeches of both Pham Van Dong and NFLSV Central Committee Presidium Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho\*\* in urging "socialist reforms, socialist construction, [and] socialist industrialization" throughout the country. The same newspaper's editorial the next day asserted that these same steps were "being gradually carried out throughout the country." The editorial of the 11th also detailed the various "economic segments" expected to have a "parallel existence" during South Vietnam's "new stage of the revolution." The editorial said there would be: "the state economic segment belonging to the entire people, the cooperative economic segment belonging to various collectives, the capitalist and private economic segment, the joint state-private economic segment, and the small-organization economic segment belonging to peasants and handicraftsmen engaged in private business."

Hanoi's 14 September NHAN DAN also carried editorial comment on the PRG statement and on the need to "make the building of socialism throughout the country an irreversible trend." According to the NHAN DAN editorial, the comprador bourgeoisie is "the sole exploiting class remaining in the South," and as such it constitutes "a tremendous obstacle on the path of advance of the South" that is "absolutely necessary to eliminate."

\* See the TRENDS of 4 September 1975, pages 14-17, for a discussion of Pham Van Dong's National Day speech.

\*\* Tho's National Day remarks at the Saigon rally are also discussed in the TRENDS of 4 September 1975, pages 14-17.

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## CAMBODIA

## SIHANOUK FETED IN PHNOM PENH, HOLDS RGNU CABINET MEETING

Phnom Penh's effusive welcoming ceremonies for Cambodian "head of state" Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth following their 9 September return to Cambodia have stressed the two leaders' contributions while on their "mission abroad" toward the April 1975 victory, at the same time hailing their return to work "shoulder to shoulder" with leaders in Cambodia on the country's future policies.

Sihanouk statements since his arrival in Phnom Penh have stressed his support for the egalitarian domestic policies set forth at the April 1975 special Cambodian congress conducted in his absence,\* and have explicitly lauded the "people's democratic revolution" currently underway in Cambodia. The prince presided over a 10 September RGNU cabinet meeting at which he reportedly voiced his "great satisfaction" over reports on the current military, economic and social policies in the country. The meetings and welcoming festivities have occasioned appearances by numerous Cambodian leaders, but the Phnom Penh media reportage on these has not yet provided any clear evidence of the leadership ranking below the level of deputy prime minister.\*\*

Following a grand welcoming ceremony at Phnom Penh's Pochentong airport on 9 September addressed by Prince Sihanouk and RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Son Sen, the prince was feted at a banquet that evening hosted and addressed by Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan. On 10 September Sihanouk met with several RGNU and NUFC officials and later held a meeting of the "entire RGNU cabinet" to hear and approve reports on the current domestic situation. On the 12th Sihanouk was honored and spoke at a Phnom Penh rally which was also addressed by RGNU Information and Propaganda Minister Hu Nim, Khieu Samphan, and representatives of the Cambodian armed forces, people, and women. Also on the 12th Sihanouk viewed a military parade in his honor and heard an address by Son Sen on military affairs. Atmospherics throughout these festivities were uniformly described as "warm" and "intimate."

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\* The 25-27 April 1975 special Cambodian national congress is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 April 1975, pages 5-6.

\*\* Initial Phnom Penh coverage of Sihanouk's arrival is discussed in the TRENDS of 10 September 1975, pages 16-18.

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Son Sen's 9 September welcoming speech and Khieu Samphan's speeches on the 9th and 12th gave balanced credit for the April insurgent victory to the contributions of insurgent armed forces, on the one hand, and to Sihanouk and "all patriotic personalities" who worked in the international arena on the other. Both leaders also hailed Sihanouk's return to join "the forces of great unity" to work "shoulder to shoulder and hand in hand" in the future. Neither Sihanouk nor his hosts referred explicitly to now standard Phnom Penh praise for the paramount leadership role in the liberation struggle and postwar development of the Cambodian "revolutionary organization"--a presumed euphemism for the Cambodian Communist Party. Concurrent Phnom Penh editorial comment, however, has duly referred to the organization as the ultimate inspiration for the regime's policies and practices.

Sihanouk and Penn Nouth received due protocol prominence at all welcoming events, followed by Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, the latter newly appointed deputy prime minister for national defense affairs. Phnom Penh failed to give a specific protocol order to lower-level officials, even though it repeatedly noted that "members of the entire RGNU" along with the NUFC Politburo and leaders of the CPNLAF were present at gatherings for Sihanouk. Hu Nim enjoyed prominence in moderating both the 9 September ceremony at the airport and the 12 September rally. He also read the cabinet report on the "situation of the people and production" at the 10 September cabinet meeting. Interior Minister Hou Yuon, who traditionally has ranked on a level with Hu Nim, has not appeared nor been referred to in radio broadcasts since before the April victory. Present among officials meeting with Sihanouk on 10 September was Touch Kim, hitherto unknown and now referred to as chairman of the NUFC committee of Phnom Penh, a position previously assigned to Chey Chum. Ieng Sary, recently appointed deputy prime minister for foreign affairs, was abroad, touring Latin America following attendance at the nonaligned meeting in Lima.

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## KOREA

### DPRK NATIONAL DAY COMMENT STRESSES KIM IL-SONG LEADERSHIP

The DPRK marked its 27th anniversary on 9 September with the traditional Pyongyang meeting, banquet, and NODONG SINMUN editorial. Neither the 9 September editorial nor speeches by Vice President Kim Tong-kyu at the 8 September meeting and by Premier Kim Il at the banquet the following day broke any new substantive ground. Unlike past years, however, Kim Tong-kyu's speech and the NODONG SINMUN editorial noted the need to follow Kim Il-song's leadership from "generation to generation," a theme discussed at length in the September 1974 issue of the party journal KULLOJA but not raised in other 1974 anniversary pronouncements. Missing from current anniversary comment was last year's heightened concern with domestic economic and political tasks and the emphasis then placed on support for the "party center."

Kim Tong-kyu reiterated standard Pyongyang support for the "struggle" of the South Korean people. Kim noted--as did the speaker at the 1974 anniversary meeting--that the struggle was experiencing "meandering," but he predicted that "in the not too distant future" the South Korean people would "overthrow the colonial fascist rule" of the United States and the government of South Korean President Pak Chong-hui. Kim called on South Korean "revolutionaries" to combine "various forms and methods of struggle" to establish a "true popular government" in the South.\*

In line with standard DPRK propaganda, Kim accused the United States and the ROK of increasing tension in Korea and demanded that U.S. troops withdraw immediately from the South. Kim refrained from harsh criticism of the Japanese role in Korea, calling on the "Japanese authorities" to avoid hampering Korea's reunification at the least, if they could not aid it. He stated that Japan should immediately renounce its "hostile policy" toward the DPRK, and cautioned that "we will always maintain a close watch on the movements of the Japanese authorities."

PEKING Peking's treatment of this year's DPRK anniversary was very similar to that in 1974, though it gave marginally less attention to the United State's role in Korea. As last year, Li Hsien-nien led the PRC delegation to the DPRK ambassador's

\* A representative of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification--a Marxist-Leninist party allegedly operating in South Korea--was listed as attending both the meeting and the banquet for the first time. Details are discussed in the TRENDS of 10 September, page 20.



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anniversary reception. While last year NCNA had reported brief remarks by the PRC foreign minister about the DPRK's success in the "struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression and interference," this year the 9 September NCNA report on the reception merely noted toasts to Chinese-Korean solidarity. The Chinese leaders' greeting message to DPRK leaders--monitored this year, as last, only on Peking radio's Korean-language service--returned to the language of the 1973 message, dropping last year's stated support for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. Peking's message this year also dropped the 1974 reference to the North's "reasonable propositions" for reunification, noting instead that by upholding its "just stand" for reunification, the North had successfully opposed the "two Koreas scheme of U.S. imperialism and the Pak Chong-hui clique."

The traditional PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the anniversary demanded that the "so-called UN Forces Command must be dissolved and U.S. troops must withdraw from South Korea totally." Last year's anniversary editorial had been somewhat harsher, calling for withdrawal of U.S. "aggressor" troops. Also omitted this time was last year's demand that the United States cease "interfering in the internal affairs of Korea." Instead, this year's editorial charged that the Pak Chong-hui "puppet clique" had aggravated tension in Korea, trampled on the North-South joint statement, and engaged in fascist suppression "under the support and connivance of U.S. imperialism." PEOPLE'S DAILY also noted Chinese sponsorship of a draft resolution on the Korean question in the United Nations, congratulated the DPRK for being admitted to the nonaligned group, and closed with strong expressions of DPRK-PRC solidarity.

MOSCOW Soviet treatment of the DPRK anniversary indicated no thaw in the frosty state of Soviet-DPRK relations. Although the rank of Soviet representatives at the DPRK charges's Moscow reception and the Soviet-sponsored anniversary meeting in Moscow was slightly higher than last year, these functions were again reported only briefly in Soviet media. The Soviet leaders' message of greetings was fully reported, but it offered only perfunctory support for Korean reunification and made no reference either to Northern proposals for reunification or to presence of foreign troops in Korea. The Soviet message noted that by proclamation of the DPRK in 1948, the Korean people had exercised the right to independent development "within the framework of their own state," a phrase which has not appeared in previous Soviet messages on the anniversary. Pyongyang apparently took umbrage at this phrase, possibly interpreting it as a hint at the existence of two Korean states, and dropped it from its own KCNA English-language and Pyongyang radio Korean-language versions of the message.

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Soviet media comment on the anniversary included at least two radio commentaries, a 6 September IZVESTIYA item devoted mainly to detailing agricultural developments in the DPRK, and a brief 7 September RED STAR article. RED STAR noted Soviet insistence on the "unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops" from South Korea, as well as Soviet support for the DPRK's "constructive proposals" aimed at liquidating tension and fostering Korean reunification. The article also noted DPRK support for a UN draft resolution on the Korean question, but failed to mention Soviet sponsorship of the resolution. Both RED STAR and a 9 September Moscow radio commentary cited an old Kim Il-song quotation paying homage to the decisive role of the Soviet Union in Korea's liberation and thus the existence of the DPRK. As usual, Soviet comment also called attention to Soviet economic aid to the DPRK. The 9 September radio commentary tried to link Korean reunification with a pro-Soviet policy, claiming that the achievement of Korean reunification could become part of "practical action on the proposal for collective security in Asia," a Soviet-sponsored proposal.

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## CHINA

## TOP PRC LEADERS ATTEND AGRICULTURAL CONFERENCE IN SHANSI

NCNA on 15 September announced the opening that day in Shansi Province of a "national conference" on learning from Tachai in agriculture, convened by the PRC State Council with "the cordial attention of Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee." The conference, apparently designed to discuss and disseminate agricultural policies for China's next five-year plan period starting in January, marks the largest publicized gathering of CCP Politburo members outside Peking since the cultural revolution. The opening meeting was addressed by Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping, Chiang Ching, and long-time Tachai leader Chen Yung-kuei. Vice Premier Hua Kuo-feng, who had just returned to Peking from Tibet on 13 September, announced the opening of the congress. Other Politburo members and alternates at the conference were Yao Wen-yuan, Chen Hsi-lien, and Wu Kuei-hsien. Four ministers of the State Council, including the minister of culture, also were listed in attendance.

Thus far NCNA has released no details of Chiang Ching's "important speech" and has only noted that Teng conveyed central greetings in his "important speech" and that he was greeted by "outbursts of stormy applause."

The available NCNA summary of Chen's speech highlighted the dual goals of achieving "farm mechanization in the main by 1980" and of further expanding the number of Tachai-type counties. Chen noted the need to implement various concrete measures, including soil improvement, water control and industrial support for agriculture, and he also stressed the necessity of ideological unity. He credited the anti-Lin Piao and Confucius movement, and "particularly" the movement to study the dictatorship of the proletariat (but not the current "Water Margin" campaign), as factors in spreading the Tachai experience. Chen's reference to the dictatorship campaign, which at its outset this year seemed to involve controversy over the extent to which "bourgeois rights" would be allowed in production, payment and marketing, serves as a reminder that the "Tachai experience" deals not only with production but also with ideological line.

The presence at the meeting of Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan, and the minister of culture, none of whom have any known agricultural duties, clearly indicates that the meeting will serve to popularize Tachai's ideological achievements as well as its production records.

NCNA's account of the session indicated that the meeting would not formulate any basic policies, but that rather participants would exchange experiences and popularize the conference line. The meeting

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was attended by 3,700 delegates, and it seems doubtful that the attending Politburo members would present anything but a united front before such a gathering. The show of leadership unity in the context of a discussion of rational economic measures may serve to quiet peasant fears of a sudden change in agricultural policies.\* The meeting also serves to put a mass imprint on the five-year plan's agricultural goals. Chen stated that a "number of important measures regarding production" would be discussed at the conference, and within central guidelines the conference may have some discretion on specific measures. The last five-year plan for agriculture seems to have been discussed also at a similar conference in 1970, which was not publicized until later.

The holding of a national conference on agriculture appears to represent a renewed effort by Peking to speed general economic development by focusing on the key role played by agriculture. NCNA on 16 September, for example, lauded Kwangsi for achieving "rapid growth in agriculture and in its light and heavy industry." Endorsing the line that "it is agriculture that decides the scale and speed of industrial development," NCNA argued that "only a developed agriculture can supply industry with the food, manpower and raw materials it requires, as well as with an expanding market for its products and funds for further growth." NCNA praised local Kwangsi party units for learning from Tachai and for giving first place to "agriculture and steadily expanding light and heavy industry on the basis of agricultural development." As a result of following the Tachai example, "Kwangsi not only meets its own needs in grain but also provides large amounts to the state."

The conference report's emphasis on agricultural mechanization and Chen's stated goal of basically achieving such mechanization by 1980 reflect Mao's longstanding concern with the problem. Agricultural mechanization was a major issue in the dispute with Liu Shao-chi. This emphasis on agriculture and agricultural equipment indicates that for the next five years at least PRC economic priorities will remain in the order of agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry. The significant increase in priority apparently accorded agricultural equipment also implies resource constraints in other sectors, possibly including the military.

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\* The image of a united leadership was also strengthened by NCNA's identification of Wang Chien as Shansi first party secretary, up from secretary, replacing Hsien Chen-hua, who has long been in political trouble.

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## NOTES

SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF CHILEAN COUP: Soviet media gave pro forma attention to the second anniversary of the 11 September 1973 coup in Chile which toppled Marxist president Salvador Allende, in marked contrast to the treatment of the first anniversary. Last year, up to 12 percent of Moscow radio comment was devoted to Chile from 9 to 22 September--a period which coincided with President Ford's press conference statements on U.S. involvement in Chile prior to the coup. This year only 3 percent of Moscow's comment for 8-14 September dealt with Chile. This year's comment, beamed primarily to Latin America, featured letters, statements and other expressions of support for the Chileans from a variety of sources in connection with a "week of international solidarity" with the Chilean people. TASS reported on "big meetings of solidarity" said to have been held in "various" Soviet cities and PRAVDA marked the occasion with an article on the 12th by Vladimir Chernyshev summing up the solidarity week. As reported by TASS, Chernyshev noted that the Soviet people condemned the "arbitrary rule of Pinochet's military-fascist regime" and expressed sympathy for the people of Chile. Asserting that Chile's military leaders "understand that their power is preserved only by bayonets," Chernyshev predicted that "they will not avoid stern justice" forever, because the Chilean people continue to struggle for freedom, supported by the socialist countries' "mighty international movement" of solidarity. In a statement reported by TASS on 11 September, the "Soviet committee for solidarity with Chilean democrats" also noted that the Soviet people "rendered, render and will render all kinds of support to the Chilean patriots' struggle." Although Cuban media, like the Soviet, have given only limited attention to the coup anniversary, the Havana domestic radio on 12 September did report a mass meeting--presided over by several Cuban CP Central Committee members--at which it was stressed that Cubans "will never fail in their internationalist duty" to the people of Chile, who will someday triumph over the junta's "terror, repression, jails and killings."

PEKING ON ANGOLA: At a 13 September banquet for a visiting Zambian goodwill delegation, PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien gave explicit and equal support for the three competing liberation movements in Angola, though not mentioning any of the groups by name. The NCNA account of Li's remarks carried his claim that China has always provided the three groups with "even-handed, friendly treatment and rendered support and assistance." In the past Peking has limited itself to routine expressions of support for "the just struggle of the Angolan people," with no indication of assistance. Peking has given equivalent friendly receptions to separate delegations from

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each of the liberation movements which have visited China over the past year, and Li's expression of even-handedness appears designed to counter recent Soviet media charges that Peking was supporting one Angolan group against the other. The vice premier bluntly countercharged--without naming the USSR--that "the superpower which claims to be the 'natural ally' of the African liberation movements" is sending "large quantities of arms" and is "doing its utmost" to provoke "fratricidal civil war" and "sow discord" among the three liberation groups.

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# APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 8 - 14 SEPTEMBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2415 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1040 items)</u>	
China	(5%) 8%	UNGA 7th Special Session	(13%) 12%
Bulgarian National Day	(-- ) 6%	Sihanouk's Return to	(2%) 10%
DPRK National Day	(-- ) 6%	Cambodia	
Gromyko Letter to UN on	(-- ) 5%	Tibet Autonomous Region	(-- ) 5%
Test Ban Proposal		10th Anniversary	
Chilean Solidarity Day	(-- ) 3%	DPRK National Day	(-- ) 4%
		USSR	(1%) 3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.